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III  
MAF  
Command Chronology

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10770 T242 of 20 October 1972.

*R. B. Tiffany 9/1/76*

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# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY



## FEBRUARY 1969

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
FPO. SAN FRANCISCO 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3K/jld

5750

Ser: 0039269

25 MAR 1969

[REDACTED] T (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)


Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1A  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology, February 1969

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

*Marion C. Dalby*  
MARION C. DALBY  
BY DIRECTION

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February 1969 - 28 February 1969

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ENCLOSURE (1)

GROUP-4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals:  
Declassified after 12 years.

  
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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

III Marine Amphibious Force

Lieutenant General Robert  
E. CUSHMAN Jr.,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
1Jun67 - 28Feb69DEPUTY COMMANDERMajor General Carl A.  
YOUNGDALE, U. S. Marine Corps  
21Dec68 - 28Feb69SUBORDINATE UNITS

XXIV Corps

Lieutenant General Richard G.  
STILWELL, U. S. Army  
1Jul68 - 28Feb69

Third Marine Division

Major General Raymond G. DAVIS,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
22May68 - 28Feb69101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile)Major General Melvin ZAIS,  
U. S. Army  
19Aug68 - 28Feb69

First Marine Division

Major General Ormond R.  
SIMPSON, U. S. Marine Corps  
20Dec68 - 28Feb69

First Marine Aircraft Wing

Major General Charles J.  
QUILTER, U. S. Marine Corps  
22Jun68 - 28Feb69

Americal Division

Major General Charles M.  
GETTYS, U. S. Army  
23May68 - 28Feb69

Force Logistic Command

Brigadier General James A.  
FEELEY, U. S. Marine Corps  
1Dec68 - 28Feb69Headquarters and Service Company  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
Headquarters CommandantColonel William K. WHITE,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
40Oct69 - 28Feb69

ENCLOSURE (1)

ATTACHED UNITS

First Radio Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. FENNEL, U. S. Marine Corps 17Oct68 - 28Feb69
29th Civil Affairs Company	Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. RAFFERTY, U. S. Army 28Nov68 - 28Feb69
7th Psychological Operations Battalion	Major Michael FORTINI, U. S. Army 25Nov68 - 28Feb69

2. LOCATION

1-28 February 1969, East Danang, Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam.

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Deputy Commanding General, Air	Major General Charles J. QUILTER, U. S. Marine Corps 22Jun68 - 28Feb69
Chief of Staff	Brigadier General George E. DOOLEY, U. S. Marine Corps 1Jan69 - 28Feb69
Deputy Chief of Staff	Colonel Michael MOSTELLER, U. S. Marine Corps 5Aug68 - 18Feb69
	Colonel Lewis G. POGGEMEYER, U. S. Marine Corps 19-28Feb69
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans	Brigadier General Warren K. BENNETT, U. S. Army 5Sep68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Colonel Maurice ROSE, U. S. Marine Corps 12Jul68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Colonel Ray N. JOENS, U. S. Marine Corps 29Jul68 - 4Feb69
	Colonel John S. CANTON, U. S. Marine Corps 5-28Feb69

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Brigadier General Carl W. HOFFMAN, U. S. Marine Corps 15Aug68 - 17Feb69
	Brigadier General Ross T. DWYER Jr., U. S. Marine Corps 18-28Feb69
Deputy G-3	Colonel Marion C. DALBY, U. S. Marine Corps 10Oct68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Colonel Lawrence C. NORTON, U. S. Marine Corps 4Jul68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Colonel Howard A. WESTPHALL, U. S. Marine Corps 1Nov68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Colonel Bill E. HORNER, U. S. Marine Corps 7Sep68 - 28Feb69
Force Psychological Operations Officer	Colonel Harold CHASE, U. S. Marine Corps 1Aug68 - 28Feb69
Force Supply Officer	Colonel Alfred C. TAVES, U. S. Marine Corps 22Jul68 - 28Feb69
Force Staff Judge Advocate	Colonel Paul W. SEABAUGH, U. S. Marine Corps 5Aug68 - 28Feb69
Force Engineer Officer	Colonel Kenneth R. BLAND, U. S. Marine Corps 22May68 - 28Feb69
Force Adjutant	Major James H. LYLES, U. S. Marine Corps 8Aug68 - 28Feb69
Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller	Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. FORD, U. S. Marine Corps 25Jul68 - 14Feb69
	Major Thomas F. DEACHER, U. S. Marine Corps 15-28Feb69

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Force Information Services Officer	Colonel Paul M. MORIARTY, U. S. Marine Corps 29Jul68 - 28Feb69
Officer in Charge, COC	Lieutenant Colonel James H. MACLEAN, U. S. Marine Corps 21Jul68 - 28Feb69
Force Food Services Officer	Lieutenant Colonel Leslie P. DAY, U. S. Marine Corps 28Sep68 - 28Feb69
Force Chaplain	Captain Robert W. RADCLIFFE, U. S. Navy 28Sep68 - 28Feb69
Force Surgeon	Captain John R. STOVER Jr., U. S. Navy 12May68 - 28Feb69
Force Dental Officer	Captain William L. DARNELL Jr., U. S. Navy 1Jul68 - 28Feb69
Force Motor Transport Officer	Lieutenant Colonel Ken D. BARNES, U. S. Marine Corps 23Dec68 - 28Feb69
Staff Secretary	Major Harold E. HAWKINS, U. S. Marine Corps 2Sep68 - 17Feb69
	Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J. WOODHAM, U. S. Marine Corps 18-28Feb69
Protocol Officer	Major William D. BENJAMIN, U. S. Marine Corps 14Jan69 - 28Feb69
Force Special Services Officer	Colonel William BIEHL Jr., U. S. Marine Corps 30Aug68 - 28Feb69
Director, Transportation Control Center	Lieutenant Colonel Orville F. MARKS, U. S. Marine Corps 1Jan69 - 28Feb69
Force Inspector	Colonel James W. SHANK, U. S. Marine Corps 16Sep68 - 28Feb69

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USMC Liaison Officer, MACV

Colonel Carl E. SCHMIDT,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
22Sep68 - 28Feb69

USMC Liaison Officer, 7th AF

Colonel Carl E. SCHMIDT,  
U. S. Marine Corps  
22Sep68 - 28Feb69

USMC Liaison Officer, ROKMC

Lieutenant Colonel Lewis J.  
BACHER, U. S. Marine Corps  
24Jun68 - 6Feb69Lieutenant Colonel John E.  
POINDEXTER, U. S. Marine Corps  
7-28Feb69

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4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTHa. III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters

	<u>Officers</u>				<u>Enlisted</u>			
	USMC	USN	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	USA	USAF
H&S Co, HQ III MAF	14	2	0	0	225	7	0	0
HQ Staff, III MAF	221	15	26	1	486	9	9	1
1ST RADBN	27	0	0	0	350	5	0	0
CAG's	42	0	0	0	1795	126	0	0
29th CA Co (att)	0	0	10	0	0	0	25	0
7th PsyOps Co (sup)	0	0	16	0	0	0	55	0

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b. III Marine Amphibious Force

<u>Officers</u>				<u>Enlisted</u>			
USMC	USN	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	USA	USAF
5097	431	5187	22	72068	2759	54008	28

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY1. INTRODUCTION

a. GENERAL. During February 1969 III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located in East Danang, Republic of Vietnam. The average personnel strength was 139,600, a decrease of 733 under the previous month.

b. ACTIVITIES. III Marine Amphibious Force continues to be guided by COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) dated 30 March 1966 in pursuit of its objectives for February 1969.

2. OVERALL EVALUATION. Enemy activity, which had remained at an unusually low level through the first weeks of the month took a sharp upturn on 23 February when the enemy launched his so-called "Post-TET Offensive." This new enemy effort was characterized by a large number of attacks by fire against military installations and population centers. Except in a few instances, however, the enemy made no attempt to follow up his bombardments with large scale ground attacks.

During the last week of February, the enemy launched a total of 56 significant attacks by fire against allied installations. The heaviest attacks occurred in the early hours of 24 February when a total of 1,518 incoming mortar rounds and 155 rockets were recorded throughout the I Corps area.

In the southern ICTZ, units of the 1st Marine Division in Operation Taylor Common, continued to uncover large amounts of enemy ammunition and supplies. On 2 February for example, C/1/7 Marines discovered an enemy cache which contained 2,000 pounds of oats, 6,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 15 individual weapons.

In the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area, the "Dewey Canyon" AO was the scene of heavy fighting as elements of the 9th Marine Regiment (Third Marine Division) thrust deep into the heart of the enemy's major supply area in the northern Ashau Valley. The heaviest contact occurred on 22 February when D/1/9 became engaged with an estimated enemy battalion. Although outnumbered, "D" Company accounted for 105 enemy KIA and captured 19 weapons.

III MAF units conducted a total of eleven major unit operations during the month of February accounting for over 1,900 enemy KIA, 811 individual weapons, and 111 crew served weapons captured.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, FEBRUARY 1969

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. The following four operations had moderate to significant contact.

a. Operation SCOTLAND II. The 3d Marine Division (TF Hotel) continued clear and search operations in Quang Tri Province with significant contact for the period 1-28 February 1969.

At 250120H FSB Neville received heavy mortar fire followed by a coordinated ground attack by an unknown number of enemy armed with small arms, RPG, and satchel charges. Results of contact were 11 USMC KIA, 42 USMC WIA, and 36 NVA KIA. Two hours later FSB Russell received a coordinated attack by an unknown number of enemy utilizing mortars, RPG's, and satchel charges. Results of contact were 19 USMC KIA, 50 USMC WIA, 51 NVA KIA, and two 105mm howitzers damaged.

Operation SCOTLAND II terminated at 282400H February 1969.

b. Operation MARSHALL MOUNTAIN. The 3d Marine Division (1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division) continued clear and search operations in Quang Tri Province with moderate contact for the period 1-28 February 1969.

At 031930H a sniper team from A/1/11 Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy with small arms, claymores, and mortars. Eight NVA were KIA. There were no friendly casualties.

At 281500H B/3/5 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of enemy. B/3/5 fired small arms and was supported by tanks, mortars, artillery, gunships, and air strikes. Results of contact were 2 USA KIA, 24 USA WIA, and 77 NVA KIA.

Operation MARSHALL MOUNTAIN terminated at 282400H February 1969.

c. Operation TAYLOR COMMON. The 1st Marine Division continued clear and search operations in Quang Nam Province with moderate contact for the period 1-28 February 1969.

At 010900H C/1/7 found 10 VC KIA. Five hours later A/1/3 found 1500-2000 pounds of oats and 6000 rounds of small arms ammo.

At 021550H a patrol from C/1/7 found 15000 pounds of rice.

At 230140H An Hoa Combat Base received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds. Four USMC were killed and 88 wounded.

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At 261300H L/3/26 engaged an estimated enemy company. L/3/26 fired all organic weapons and was supported by artillery. Results of contact were 6 USMC KIA, 29 USMC WIA, and 9 NVA KIA.

Between 271805H and 280500H L/3/5 accounted for 7 NVA KIA in scattered contacts. Friendly casualties were one USMC WIA.

At 281530H L/3/26 received sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy. L/3/26 called artillery and gunships and assaulted the enemy position killing 6 VC. Friendly casualties were one USMC KIA and 5 USMC WIA.

At 282020H K/3/26 received heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. K/3/26 returned fire and called Spooky. Results of contact were 3 USMC KIA, 15 USMC WIA, and 9 NVA KIA.

d. Operation DEWEY CANYON. The 3d Marine Division (9th Marines) continued clear and search operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces with significant contact for the period 1-28 February 1969.

At 011455H H/2/9 found 9 NVA KIA.

At 051400H lead elements of G/2/9 made contact with an estimated 15-20 NVA in concealed positions. Five USMC were killed and 17 wounded. Enemy casualties were 2 NVA KIA.

At 110800H M/3/9 received small arms, grenade, and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. M/3/9 returned fire, called artillery and air strikes. Three USMC were wounded and evacuated and 4 NVA were killed. At 111440H M/3/9 again received small arms fire. Two USMC were wounded. M/3/9 returned fire killing 2 NVA.

At 112200H A,B,C/1/9 were attacked by an estimated enemy company. A,B,C/1/9 fired all organic weapons and were supported by artillery. Results of contact were one USMC KIA, 8 USMC WIA, and 12 NVA KIA.

At 121700H M/3/9 was engaged by an estimated 25 NVA armed with small arms, RPG, and mortars. Results of contact were 12 NVA KIA. There were no friendly casualties.

At 131425H C/1/9 engaged a reinforced NVA platoon. Results of contact were 6 USMC KIA, 6 USMC WIA, and 15 NVA KIA. At 132300H C/1/9 was again in action with an estimated enemy company. Results of contact were 3 USMC KIA, 21 USMC WIA, and 12 NVA KIA.

Between 152000H and 160700H C/1/9 received several probes

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followed by an attack by an estimated enemy platoon. Results of contact were 13 NVA KIA. There were no friendly casualties.

At 170405H HQ 9th Marines received a heavy ground attack supported by mortars. 9th Marines returned fire and the action continued until 0700H. Results of contact were 4 USMC KIA, 46 USMC WIA, and 37 NVA KIA.

At 160845H K/3/9 engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The action continued until 161400H. Results of contact were 7 USMC WIA and 14 NVA KIA.

At 180940H A/1/9 assaulted a well prepared enemy position in a ridge line. Results of contact were one USMC WIA and 20 NVA KIA.

At 190820H a patrol from C/1/9 engaged a well entrenched enemy force in prepared positions. Nineteen NVA were KIA. Friendly casualties were one USA WIA. One hour later C/1/9 engaged a second enemy force in bunkers. Results of contact were one USMC KIA, 8 USMC WIA, and 13 NVA KIA.

At 201600H C/1/9 engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. After air and artillery preparation C/1/9 assaulted and seized the enemy position. Friendly casualties were 4 USMC KIA, 24 USMC WIA, 71 NVA KIA, and 5 crew served weapons captured including two 122mm howitzers and one 12.7mm AA gun. One five ton truck and one prime mover were also captured.

At 211530H M/3/9 found and destroyed a bulldozer.

At 221500H A/1/9 received heavy small arms and mortar fire from an estimated enemy battalion in bunkers. After preparation by artillery, mortars, and air strikes, A/1/9, reinforced by D/1/9, assaulted and seized the enemy position. Results of contact were 10 USMC KIA, 61 USMC WIA, and 105 NVA KIA.

At 271300H a platoon from G/2/9 engaged an estimated 25 NVA. The platoon called artillery and was reinforced from the company command group. Results of contact were 3 USMC KIA, 12 USMC WIA, and 12 NVA KIA.

At 271100H D/1/9 found a weapons cache containing 629 individual weapons, 56 machine guns, ten 82mm mortars, fifteen 57mm recoilless rifles, one .50 caliber machine gun, one 120mm mortar, one 20mm AA gun, fifteen 12.7mm AA guns, three 23mm AA guns, and 3 multi-machine guns,

e. The following seven operations did not have any significant contact during the period indicated:

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<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
LINN RIVER	QUANG NAM	1-7 February 1969
RUSSELL BEACH	QUANG NGAI	1-28 February 1969
VERNON LAKE II	QUANG NGAI	1-28 February 1969
HARDIN FALLS	QUANG TIN	1-28 February 1969
FAYETTE CANYON	QUANG NAM	1-28 February 1969
NEVADA EAGLE	THUA THIEN	1-28 February 1969
KENTUCKY	QUANG TRI	1-28 February 1969

2. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY. See page 26.

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**SECRET****3. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES SUSTAINED****a. III MAF Casualties:****(1) Battle**

<u>KIA</u>			<u>WIA</u>			<u>DOW</u>			<u>MIA</u>		
USMC	USN	USA									
265	13	104	1634	58	542	23	0	8	5	0	21

**(2) Non-Battle**

<u>DEATHS</u>			<u>INJ/ILL</u>		
USMC	USN	USA	USMC	USN	USA
44	0	9	234	12	185

**b. Number of Courts-Martial tried:**

Summary 139

Special 99

General 15

**c. Short tons of Mail sent and received by III MAF:**

Sent: 176            Received: 419

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## 4. Personnel.

## a. Special Services Activities

(1) Freedom Hill Recreation Complex(a) LIBRARY: No Change from last report.(b) THEATER: The Theater was operational 20 days in February. Total attendance was 18,476.(c) GYMNASIUM: No change from last report.(d) OUTDOOR FACILITIES: No change from last report.(e) BOWLING CENTER: The bowling center was operational 18 days in February. Total attendance was approximately 2,043.(f) CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED: The TORRI in front of the Recreation Center was completed during February.(g) MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PENDING:

1. The practice batting cage is in the process of being constructed.

2. The stairways on Freedom Hill are being rebuilt.

3. The miniature golf course has been started.

4. The roof and enclosure for the beer garden is nearing completion.

(h) MAJOR ACTIVITIES: None.(2) R&R Activities

(a) Of 6328 seats allocated to III MAF, 5361 were filled for 84.7% utilization. Of 7395 seats allocated to III MAF (Including Naval Forces in I Corps), 6642 were filled for 86.9% utilization. Total allocations for Danang R&amp;R Center consisted of 10,059 seats of which 9947 were filled for a utilization percentage of 98.8%.

(b) The following are the February statistics for III MAF and I Corps R&amp;R usage for each out-of-country site:

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<u>SITE</u>	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>OTHER I CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
BANGKOK	1051	407	1458
HONG KONG	680	453	1133
TAIPEI	639	333	972
TOKYO	462	197	659
MANILA	137	126	263
SINGAPORE	133	185	318
SYDNEY	1536	774	2310
HAWAII	1447	492	1939
OKINAWA	254	30	284
KUALA LUMPUR	190	259	449
PENANG	113	49	162
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>6642</u>	<u>3305</u>	<u>9947</u>

(c) In-Country R&R (China Beach) Quotas allocated were utilized by 799 personnel. This does not include daily users. Daily users for the month of February totaled 4,330.

(3) Entertainment

Sebastian Cabot	4-20 February	Handshake Tour
Gene Stridel	22-25 February	Musical Variety Show
Kiki Paige	15-20 February	Musical Variety Show
Pat Obrien	7-15 February	Handshake Tour
The Lively Affair	8-28 February	Musical Variety Show
Mr. Daniels&Friends	4-8 February	Handshake Fashion Show

(4) MARS Activities (18 stations in I Corps)

(a) Messages sent	10,182
(b) Messages received	7,332
(c) Phone patches sent & received	8,138
(d) Hospital Calls	58

(5) Tape Facility

(a) 2,269 pre-recorded musical tapes were produced during this period.

(b) 1,938 pre-recorded musical tapes were sold during this period.

(6) Film Library

(a) 83 films received from Saigon were put into the circuit in I Corps area.

(b) 218 films were repaired by this facility.

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(7) Stars and Stripes Distribution

(a) 39,347 Stars and Stripes free issue newspapers were distributed in the I Corps area on a daily basis.

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## b. Force Chaplain

4 February. The Force Chaplain visited 5th ARVN Regiment and the Venerable, Captain, Thich Thien Duc, Buddhist Chaplain at Duy Tan General Hospital to discuss support requirements for social service and patient work.

5 February. Force Chaplain assisted in the delivery of seven truckloads of food stuffs recovered from the Freedom Hill Exchange fire. These foodstuffs were delivered to Boy's Town, the Sacred Heart Orphanage, the Leporarium and the China Beach Orphanage. The Force Chaplain was visited by the Staff Chaplain, 9th MAB and discussed chaplain personnel matters and support requirements for the 26th Marines while in country.

6 February. The Force Chaplain attended the I Corps Dependents Relief Association Dinner as the guest of Mrs. Hoang Xuan Lam. Discussed with Captain Chang Soong Chir, the recently arrived Senior Chaplain of the ROK Marine Brigade our support of their religious program in the supply of consumable ecclesiastical supplies.

7 February. Delivered 1000 childrens toys to the ICTZ Dependents Relief Association for distribution at children's parties incident to TET. Visited the I Corps Advisory Group Headquarters to confer with the Staff Chaplain relative to coordination of Army Chaplain matters.

9 February. Attended program at American Vietnamese Cultural Center. Force Chaplain picked up, with assistance of volunteer help, three truckloads of fire-damaged foodstuffs and articles from the Freedom Hill Exchange. Articles were recovered for the purpose of redistribution to orphanages, schools and hospitals.

10 February. Escorted Army Chief of Chaplains, Major General Frances Sampson, USA on his visit to ICTZ. Held chaplains Dinner in honor of Chaplain Sampson's visit at the China Beach "O" Club. 70 chaplains were in attendance.

11 February. Picked up from Freedom Hill Exchange 65 cases of tomato juice and delivered same to Boys Town Orphanage, Danang. Entertained party of Buddhist, Protestant and Catholic chaplains from Duy Tan General Hospital (ARVN) to plan delivery of health and comfort packs to ARVN patients in ARVN Hospitals in I Corps.

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12 February. Together with the Buddhist (Venerable Thich Thien Duc) and Catholic (Capt. Nguyen Van Chanh) Chaplains, assisted in the delivery of 1700 health and comfort pacs to wounded ARVN patients in Duy Tan General Hospital. 415 of these pacs were purchased out of funds in the III MAF Chaplain's Civic Action Fund.

13 February. As the guest of Mrs. Huang Xuan Lam, the Force Chaplain attended a party for orphans from the Buddhist orphanage sponsored by the I Corps Dependents Relief Association. Made arrangements for and took a party consisting of one Buddhist, one Protestant and one Catholic Chaplain and their assistants to the ARVN Hospitals at Quang Ngai and Hue for delivery of TET health and comfort pacs to wounded ARVN patients. The Force Chaplain sent two truckloads of food-stuffs and TET gifts to the Vietnamese Correction and Rehabilitation Center in Hoi An.

14 February. Escorted Brigadier General HUBBARD, USMC, Chief of Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, on a tour of the China Beach Orphanage. Attended a program sponsored by ARVN Social Service at the 5th ARVN Regiment.

15 February. Attended, as guest of Lieutenant General Lam, a New Years party at the I Corps Officers Club.

22 February. Force Chaplain discussed MCB coverage in I Corps with MCBPAC Staff Chaplain who was in country on a visit of the chaplains under his supervision.

25 February. Escorted the Staff Chaplain, COMNAVFORV, on a familiarization visit to 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Wing and Force Logistic Command.

27 February. Visited the Reverend Gordon Smith to discuss material requirement for completion of the Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth Memorial Baby Pavilion at the China Beach Orphanage.

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## 5. Intelligence

a. General Enemy Situation. Ground fighting remained generally at a reduced level in all five provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone during the first three weeks of the month of February 1969. Although the enemy continued to maintain a limited degree of pressure on friendly installations and tactical units through small unit operations and harassing attacks by fire, friendly forces encountered only sporadic resistance, most of which did not result in any real significant engagements. The one exception was Operation DEWEY CANYON in southern QUANG TRI Province where elements of the 9th Marines elicited sharp reaction throughout most of the month from enemy forces defending their logistical complex in Base Area 611.

The early part of February produced a wealth of intelligence information in I Corps, all of which pointed towards the renewal of enemy offensive activity during the TET holidays. Unlike the TET 1968 however, the 1969 TET holiday period passed without incident in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Nevertheless, the week of 23 February - 1 March witnessed a significant increase in activity in southern I Corps as enemy forces subordinate to Military Region 5 conducted a series of widespread attacks throughout the three southern provinces in concert with the first phase of the enemy's RVN-wide post-TET offensive.

On the I-5 FRONT, between the DMZ and Route 9, activity during the early part of February was generally light with contacts being scattered and desultory. However, ground action increased noticeably in the western reaches of Quang Tri (P) during the latter part of the month.

Sightings/incidents of enemy activity continued unabated on a daily basis in the eastern DMZ while swimmer/sappers, most likely elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment, continued to make their presence known along the vital CGA VENT River. Enemy efforts along this key waterway were highlighted by the successful 21 February mining of four ICs at the mouth of the river by Frogmen equipped with highly sophisticated Russian close-circuit SCUBA gear and magnetic limpet mines.

Friendly convoys operating on Route 49 were ambushed on two successive occasions between CM 40 and the ROCKETS during the middle of the month, the first such incidents since November of last year. A DZ contact during the first ambush was subsequently identified as a member of the 17th NV Independent Battalion, 31st Group, a unit which normally operates in the area.

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Intelligence during February indicated a possible build-up of the enemy's forces in the northwestern portion of QUANG TRI (P) and along the western reaches of the DMZ. Reconnaissance teams were forced to abort missions on more than one occasion as a result of contacts with the enemy, and several unconfirmed reports of vehicle activity emanated from this region. Also, photographic readouts produced evidence of a southwesterly extension of Route 1022-3 in the DMZ north of the ROCKPILE.

Enemy activity increased noticeably in the area during the last week of the month when enemy forces conducted ground attacks against two remote Marine fire support bases northwest of the ROCKPILE on 25 February. In the first of these engagements, elements of the 27th NVA Independent Regiment conducted a major attack against FSB RUSSELL, penetrating the perimeter and overrunning portions of the installation. Marines manning the fire support base sustained heavy casualties while the enemy was successful in destroying one 105mm howitzer. The second attack, of lesser intensity, was directed against FSB NVILLE and produced light casualties on both sides. Although there was no enemy unit identification in the latter attack, elements of the 246th NVA Regiment, a frequently mentioned but rarely seen unit, were believed to have been involved. Also of significance was a series of contacts at the month's end by elements of the 3rd Marines and Task Force 3/5 Armored Cavalry in the area of a large bunker complex northwest of CU LO which produced 112 enemy KIA's, also believed to be members of the 27th NVA Regiment.

Throughout February the enemy threat in the R-5 FRONT area continued to be assessed as five infantry regiment equivalents in the immediate vicinity of the DMZ, supported by one to two artillery regiments.

For the first time in many months, the focus of attention in I Corps shifted away from the eastern QUANG NAM (P)/FRONT 4 area to the area of operations for MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE. Throughout the month, the enemy reacted vigorously to the incursions made by the 9th Marine Regiment in the DEWEY CANYON AO of southwestern QUANG TRI (P). This reaction took the form of 120mm artillery, mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle fire on an almost daily basis as well as several ground attacks conducted by up to company size enemy units. It was apparent that the enemy's response was a reflection of his determination to protect his threatened logistic facilities in the Base Area 611/A SHAU Valley complex, and his reaction throughout the month underscored the importance which he assigned to this area. As some measure of the intensity of fighting in this major operation which commenced on 22 January is the fact that by the end of the month the Marines had accounted for 1,125 confirmed enemy KIA's. However, of equal and perhaps greater importance was the uncovering of a vast arms and ammunition cache -- the largest of the Vietnam War -- as well as the capture of several 120mm field guns and full-tracked prime movers. The capture of these 120mm field guns marked the largest such artillery pieces captured to date in the Vietnam War. Documents captured in the DEWEY CANYON AO during the month identified elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, and elements of the 6th NVA Regiment as well as some rear service elements, infiltration units and/or command elements, also believed to have been recovered.

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Noteworthy with respect to the DEWEY CANYON operation was the discovery of a new road in the southern extremities of QUANG TRI Province. The road runs generally in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction, branching off of Route 922 in LAOS and extending to an area north of TIGER Mountain in the extreme northern end of A SHAU Valley. The road is evaluated as a probable attempt on the part of the enemy to by-pass vulnerable points on Routes 922/448 by entering the A SHAU Valley north of TIGER Mountain.

Elsewhere in the MRTTH area, there was little significant ground fighting during the month, and the enemy's efforts were largely confined to a few random attacks by fire of low intensity, most of which were directed against installations along Route 71.

On the other hand, there were several significant adjustments in the disposition of major enemy tactical units in MRTTH during February. The 7th FRONT Headquarters was relocated from southern Base Area 101 to the southeastern extremities of the DA KRONG Valley in southern QUANG TRI Province, while the 26th (ABA 806) Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment was confirmed by the capture of two PWs and a number of documents to have relocated from eastern LAOS to the northwestern corner of THUA THIEN Province.

Southeast of QUANG TRI City near Base Area 101, a PW captured on 28 February was identified as a member of the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment, thus confirming prior contentions that although most of the 812th Regiment had returned to NVN, elements of at least one battalion remained south of the DMZ.

Two noteworthy moves on the part of elements of the 5th NVA Regiment also occurred in THUA THIEN (P) during February. The first of these two adjustments was in the form of a 12 kilometer northwesterly shift of the Headquarters, 5th NVA Regiment from the NAM DONG-RUOI RUOI area. The most significant move, however, was the relocation of the K-10 Battalion from the NAM DONG-RUOI RUOI area to the piedmont area between Base Area 114 and HUE, thus increasing the threat against the THUA THIEN provincial capital.

In the PHU LOC area in the southeastern portion of THUA THIEN (P) where most of the enemy's activity was concentrated, several PW's from the K-4B Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment were captured during the month, thus confirming the continued presence of elements of this major enemy tactical unit in its normal operating area.

Of particular significance was the capture of a HOI CHANH from the 559th Transportation Group who rallied to elements of the 101st Airborne Division (A) south of HUE during the early part of the month. Subsequent interrogation of this rallier provided detailed information on his unit which has the responsibility of transporting food from LAOS to THUA THIEN (P) and evacuating wounded soldiers to NVN.

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The three southern provinces which comprise the Military Region 5 area Corps were unusually quiet during the first three weeks of the month of February. Enemy initiated activity was at an extremely low level as most major enemy tactical units concentrated their efforts on avoiding contact with friendly forces while making last minute preparations for the so-called "Winter-Spring" offensive.

Eastern QUANG NAM (P) was relatively quiescent during this particular period after having produced the highest level of enemy activity in I Corps Tactical Zone for the past several months. Ground engagements were, for the most part, sporadic and small-scale in nature and were widely scattered throughout the eastern portion of the province. The only real significant contact took place southeast of HILL 55 on 16 February when elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enemy battalion killing 49 NVA and capturing three PWs, all of whom were identified as members of the 1st Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment. Northwest of DANANG, the NAM O-ELEPHANT Valley area remained a subject of concern as friendly forces continued to encounter enemy troops in this region. While these encounters were light in nature and involved only small enemy forces, nevertheless the contacts were indicative of the importance the enemy placed on the area as a likely avenue of approach into DANANG during future attacks. Also, the recently reopened DANANG-HUE railroad continued to be a favorite target of enemy sappers as twice during the month trains operating between NAM O and the HAI VAN Pass struck mines along the tracks. These mineings were most likely carried out by the HAI VAN Engineer Battalion, a newly identified unit operating northwest of DANANG with the mission of LOC interdiction in the NAM O-HAI VAN Pass area.

The general enemy situation in both QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces remained unchanged during the first three weeks of the month. There was no significant ground action in either province as major enemy tactical units refused engagement, remaining withdrawn and scattered in the piedmont and highland regions of both provinces. Local harassment characterized the extent of the enemy's efforts with this harassment manifesting itself in the form of scattered harassing attacks by fire, a few small ground/sapper attacks and terrorism of hamlets, villages and refugee camps. One significant change in the enemy's order of battle was the addition of the probable 78th MF Artillery Battalion, a new unit believed operating in the mountains west of CHU LAI in QUANG TIN Province. The unit is credited with a 122mm rocket, 82mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle capability and a strength of 225 men.

The much heralded and long awaited "Winter-Spring" offensive finally kicked off in earnest during the early morning hours of 23 February when the Communists launched a coordinated series of attacks throughout the Republic of SVN. With respect to the I Corps Tactical Zone, the type and nature of these attacks were precisely of the character which had long been predicted, i.e., attacks by fire interspersed with sapper attacks and light to moderate ground attacks.

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Although attacks occurred in northern I Corps, the enemy's main effort was quite clearly focused south of the HAI VAN Pass. Throughout the three southern provinces stand-off attacks by fire were prevalent. It was apparent that great care had been taken in target selection, and it was significant that almost without exception only military or military oriented targets were struck and also that in the sensitive northern provinces of THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI, only two significant attacks occurred--those against FSB's RUSSELL and NEVILLE.

As was expected, the major cities of DANANG, TAM KY and QUANG NGAI were the subject of special attention by the enemy. Almost all major military installations in the DANANG area were subjected to some form of attack by fire. Unlike past experiences the airfields escaped generally unscathed, except for the loss of 240,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel at the DANANG Airbase when a storage tank was hit by incoming rocket fire. The ARVN ammunition dump adjacent to III MAF compound was 40% destroyed by fire caused by incoming rockets. Several naval landing craft and the bridge ramp in the vicinity of the I Corps Bridge were destroyed or badly damaged by an explosion of unknown origin and both the 1st Marine Division and the 26th Marine Regimental CP's were subjected to sapper attacks.

Elsewhere in QUANG NAM (P), there was moderate to heavy fighting southwest of DANANG where the 7th Marines engaged elements of the 31st and 141st NVA Regiments. North of the CAU DO River, in the vicinity of HOA VANG District Headquarters, elements of the 38th NVA Regiment were engaged and badly mauled by ARVN Rangers. Along the coastline, the 1st Marine Regiment easily turned back a sapper attack by additional elements of the 38th NVA Regiment. Between DIEN BAN and the CAU DO River, the 51st ARVN Regiment had a series of battles with the 36th and 38th NVA Regiments during the early part of the week and the AN HOA Combat Base was subjected to a number of attacks by fire, one of which destroyed a substantial part of their ammunition dump and forced the temporary closing of the airstrip. At HOI AN City, elements of the Q.80 LF Battalion and the V.25 Battalion, 38th Regiment conducted a combination mortar and ground attack against the QUANG NAM provincial capital. Sporadic contact continued in and around HOI AN throughout most of 23 February with enemy forces sustaining approximately 40 KIA and several prisoners of war. By the week's end, both the intensity and character of enemy initiated action had returned to almost the pre-23 February levels.

It was significant that neither of the two regiments of the 2nd NVA Division -- the 1st VC or the 21st NVA -- were identified in contact. However, elements of the 5th and 26th Marine Regiments made a number of attacks throughout the week in the ARIZONA area north and northeast of AN HOA which were most probably with elements of the 21st Regiment.

In QUANG TIN Province, the enemy efforts were focused upon two locations -- TAM KY City and the CUDC Camp at TIEN PHUOC. Military positions to the west and southwest of TAM KY were subjected to serious ground attacks on three occasions. On the first day of the enemy's offensive, elements of the 72nd and V.16 Local Force Battalions attempted to seize the hills immediately to the west of the camp. The 38th received two successive heavy mortar and ground attacks; however, they were quickly blunted by elements of the 1st Marine Division. ARVN forces who inflicted heavy casualties on

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forces involved and captured the Executive Officer of the 72nd Battalion. Two days later, the 70th VC Main Force Battalion, supported by fire from the 74th VC Local Force Battalion, was engaged southwest of TAM KY in an action which saw the enemy suffer 168 KIA's.

West southwest of TAM KY City, TIEN PHUOC Special Forces/CIDG Camp was subjected to a heavy attack by fire and limited ground action by the enemy. Although no units were positively identified, a prisoner interrogated at TAM KY City and the general disposition of enemy forces in QUANG TIN (P) indicated that the enemy unit in contact was most probably the 3rd Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division. The threat to TIEN PHUOC had abated somewhat by the end of the week.

Elsewhere in QUANG TIN (P), CHU LAI received 50 rounds of inaccurate rocket fire on the first day of the offensive. Throughout the week, sporadic attacks by fire occurred with a few casualties and little damage recorded.

The same pattern of attack by fire and limited ground attacks noted in QUANG TIN Province were repeated in QUANG NGAI Province. Almost without exception the province's district headquarters were struck by direct and indirect fires. The build-up of forces in the vicinity of QUANG NGAI City which had been observed during the preceding two weeks erupted in sporadic enemy attacks throughout the week. Nearly 200 enemy were killed or captured in contacts south and west of the city. The 22nd Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division and the 38th and 81st VC Local Force Battalions were identified as being engaged in these contacts while elements of the 48th VC Local Force Battalion were identified in contacts just north of the city.

It was apparent by the month's end that at least the initial phase of the enemy's offensive was at an end. NVA/VC operations had subsided markedly and the general tempo of operations was at about, or slightly higher than, the levels experienced prior to 23 February. While there were few indicators on the battlefield that the enemy intended to pursue his renewed effort, there was, however, a large body of agent reports and prisoner interrogations all of which attested to the fact that the flurry of enemy activity during the last week of February marked only the beginning, the first phase of an offensive which would last throughout March 1969.

b. Enemy Action Statistics. Facts pertaining to enemy activities in Allied operating areas, including combat bases, for the month of February are as follows:

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>ROK/C</u>
Attack	20	5	47	1
Amoosh	3	1	7	0
Assault by Fire	34	8	22	8
Harassing Fire	791	23	244	92
Mine/Booby Traps	228	1	29	18
Artillery Fire	1,214	0	26	0

Total acts of terrorism for ICYK 246

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c. Enemy Order of Battle. Confirmed enemy forces operating in ICTZ on 27 February 1969.

(1) QUANG TRI: Confirmed units in QUANG TRI include only those considered to be operating south of the DMZ. Major units are: the 7th Front Headquarters; the 512th NVA Regiment and the E8 and K14 Infantry, the 10th Sapper and the E32 Artillery Battalions subordinate to the 7th Front; and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 27th NVA Independent Regiment. Additionally, five independent companies are located within the province. The total confirmed strength in QUANG TRI is 3,340.

(2) THUA THIEN: The K4B and K4C Battalions of the 4th NVA Regiment; the K4 and K10 Infantry and the Chi Thua 1 and Chi Thua 2 Sapper Battalions of the 5th NVA Regiment; the 806th Battalion of the 6th NVA Regiment; and six independent companies are located within the province. The total confirmed strength for THUA THIEN is 2,810.

(3) QUANG NAM: Enemy forces in QUANG NAM are comprised of: the Front 4 Headquarters; the 2nd NVA Division Headquarters and support units; the 1st VC and the 21st NVA Regiments of the 2nd NVA Division; the 102nd and 103rd Battalions of the 31st NVA Regiment; the 36th NVA Regiment; the 141st NVA Regiment; the 368B Artillery Regiment; the R20, V25, D7 Infantry and the T89 and 3rd Sapper Battalions of the 38th NVA Regiment; the 1st Battalion of the 68B NVA Artillery Regiment; and seven independent companies. The total confirmed strength in the province is 10,115.

(4) QUANG TIN: The 31st NVA Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division; four independent battalions and three independent companies are located in the province. The total confirmed strength in QUANG TIN is 1,930.

(5) QUANG NGAI: The Military Region-5 Headquarters; the 3rd NVA Division Headquarters and support units; the 2nd MP and 22nd NVA Regiments of the 3rd NVA Division; the 120th VC Infantry, the 406th VC Sapper and the 107th NVA Artillery Battalions of the 401st NVA Sapper Regiment; three independent battalions and 13 independent companies are located in the province. The total confirmed strength in QUANG NGAI is 7,515.

d. Counterintelligence.

(1) Counterintelligence Monthly Overview. The level of counterintelligence-related incidents rose sharply during February, reaching a peak during the final week of the month. The high level of activity generally coincided with the initiation of a coordinated series of attacks by fire and limited ground assaults which started 23 February 1969. While these attacks were preceded or supported by sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and terrorist activity, significant political support failed to materialize. The ability of GVN and U.S. agencies to predict with accuracy the timing, extent, and nature of the 23 February attacks is of particular counterintelligence significance.

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(2) Propaganda and Subversion. Viet Cong propaganda and proselyting activities increased markedly during the month. Indoctrination of VC cadre and soldiers continued with the objectives of extracting a maximum effort during the Winter-Spring Campaign and combating pessimism and defeatism, widely mentioned in captured enemy documents as being prevalent. Propaganda aimed at the populace generally urged support for peace and a coalition government.

(3) Political Activity. Reports continued of preparations for large-scale political demonstrations to demand an end to the war and formation of a coalition government. Captured documents confirm that elaborate plans and preparations were made for demonstrations to be held in DANANG, QUANG NGAI City, and TAM KY in coordination with military attacks on those cities. That none of the planned demonstrations materialized is indicative of the disparity between Viet Cong intentions and capabilities in the political sphere.

(4) Terrorism. Incidents of terrorism increased during the month, coinciding with the initiation of ground attacks. GVN hamlet and village officials continued to be a primary target of terrorism, although pacification and Popular Self Defense personnel increasingly became victims of assassinations.

(5) Sabotage. Continued attempts were made in mid-February to interdict river traffic on the CUA VIET River. In conjunction with ground assaults during the period 23-25 February, a coordinated effort was made to interdict Highway 1 in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces, apparently aimed at isolating TAM KY and QUANG NGAI cities. The DANANG-HUE railroad was also the target of repeated sabotage incidents in the HAI VAN Pass area. With the exception of the CUA VIET River, sabotage incidents were almost exclusively confined to LOC's in the three southern provinces of ICTZ.

(6) Espionage. Low level espionage continued during the month with reported activity confined primarily to the two northern provinces and QUANG TIN. A North Vietnamese officer captured during the month revealed that the VC are making widespread use of overtly procured Vietnamese and U.S. publications to gather intelligence on GVN and Allied installations. Pictures of air bases and logistics installations are particularly valuable to the VC for planning rocket and sapper attacks.

e. Enemy Losses. Enemy losses during the month of February were as follows:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>ROKMC</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
KIA	3,694	1,910	230	127	5,961
PW/NVA	33	0	2	0	35
PW/VC	38	107	3	4	152
Returnee/NVA	3	0	0	0	3
Returnee/VC	13	25	0	0	38
Civil Defendant	216	120	0	0	336
Innocent Civilian	501	0	0	0	501
Individual Weapon	1,624	620	83	25	2,568
C/S Weapon	223	59	10	0	292

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f. Kit Carson Scout Program. Significant accomplishments of Kit Carson Scouts employed by Marine Divisions for period 1-28 February 1969 were as follows:

	<u>1st Mar Div</u>	<u>3rd Mar Div</u>
a. Patrols	652	350
b. Classes Conducted	29	31
c. Psyops Broadcasts	17	00
d. Enemy Killed	26	2
e. Enemy Captured/Suspects Apprehended	26	4
f. Weapons Recovered	17	6
g. Returnees	00	4
h. Caves/Tunnels/Caches Detected	00	00
i. Mines/booby traps Detected	42	10

7 February 1969. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, III MAF hosted the first III MAF Kit Carson Scout Conference between 1300 and 1600 in the Commanding General's Conference Room. The purpose of the conference was to provide the personnel connected with the management of the Kit Carson Scout program in ICTZ an opportunity to meet each other and to discuss policy, procedures and responsibilities of the program. Representatives of Headquarters, XXIV Corps, 3rd Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (A), 1st Marine Division, Americal Division, Naval Support Activity, COMUS ICTZ, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-3, and G-4, attended the conference.

17 February 1969. During the Tet holiday, a large number of Kit Carson Scouts took unauthorized absence. After the holiday period, only two scouts failed to return to their units.

28 February 1969. The status of Kit Carson Scouts was as follows:

	No. <u>KCS Employed</u>	No. <u>KCS Recruited</u>	No. <u>IA-IA-IJA-Deserted</u>			
a. 1st Mar Div	106	7	1	2	0	1
b. 3rd Mar Div	103	21	1	1	0	0
c. 101st Air Div (A)	120	0	1	2	0	0
d. Americal Div	113	2	1	2	0	0

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6. LOGISTICS

a. General. Early February saw a stabilizing of logistic effort between northern and southern ICTZ. While enemy responses to U.S. and FWMAF operations remained heaviest in the southern sector, and Operation TAYLOR COMMON (1st MarDiv) continued to draw substantial support, Operation DEWEY CANYON (3d MarDiv) gradually increased in pace. By the end of the reporting period emphasis had once again shifted south.

(1) In the south, Operation TAYLOR COMMON went into its final stages with sporadic contacts reported. While generally operating close to established LOC, the ability to resupply by air was always vital. Cargo planes and truck convoys delivered supplies to the airfield at An Hoa, which were then forwarded to units in the field by helicopters and smaller vehicles.

(2) Operation DEWEY CANYON, in the headwaters of the Da Krong, north and west of the Ashau Valley, evolved into a severe logistic defeat for the NVA/VC. The number, size, and composition of enemy supply caches discovered and destroyed rose throughout the month and continued unabated into the next reporting period. Varying in size from a few bags of rice and small arms ammunition up to field pieces and tracked vehicles, the impact of these losses on the enemy has been great. As in other deep jungle/mountain penetrations resupply was accomplished solely by air. The effects of the weather on this operation are discussed later.

(3) Until the last week of February interdiction of rear areas and LOC was relatively light when compared to previous months, but early on 23 February the enemy began a concerted campaign of harassment. The below listed incidents are discussed further in subsequent sub-paragraphs:

- 10Feb - The Hue-to-Danang passenger train was derailed by three electric mines, causing minor track and train damage and slightly injuring 3 passengers. Repairs were completed and service resumed within 24 hours.
- 21Feb - 3 U.S. Navy boats were damaged by mines in the Cua Viet. This incident had only minimal and temporary effect on resupply by river (locally).

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23Feb - The An Hoa ASP was 50% (1292 S/T and four berms) destroyed during a sapper/rocket & mortar attack. Also lost was approximately 20,000 gallons of fuel in 4 partially filled 10,000 gallon fuel bags. Immediate replacement action provided safe levels of POL and ammo by the 25th.

Impacting in an ARVN ASP in Danang (East), enemy rockets started a series of explosions that eventually consumed 40% of on-hand stocks, (approximately 4,000 S/T) caused extensive damage to the southern area of the ASP and minor damage to the adjacent NSA covered storage area (5% of the reefer space was damaged).

An enemy rocket destroyed a small quantity of aircraft (ordnance) rocket motors and a partially filled 10,000 gallon fuel bag on the Danang Airfield.

Enemy sappers dropped two 80 foot concrete spans of a bridge crossing the Song Tra Bong on route QL-1. Normal traffic resumed in less than 24 hours across tactical bridging.

A mortar attack on the Marble Mountain Air Facility caused limited damage to 6 helicopters and minor damages to nearby structures. All 6 helicopters were operational within 72 hours.

27Feb - The Hue-to-Danang patrol train was derailed by two command detonated mines, causing minor track and train damage. Repairs were completed within 24 hours.

A rocket attack on the Danang Bridge Ramp, where ammunition was being loaded, caused the destruction of two boats and extensive damage and casualties in the immediate vicinity. A total of 344 S/T of ammunition (112-USMC, 332-USA) was destroyed.

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Although repairs on the ramp area will continue until late March, the Ramp was opened and functioning normally early on 1 March.

(4) The weather during the month did not markedly restrict resupply activities, however, its effects were much more noticeable than in the past two reporting periods. Surface (water) cargo operations were suspended for 5 days due to surf and sea conditions, and most aerial resupply to Operation DEWEY CANYON had to be accomplished during the afternoons due to morning fog and low-lying clouds. For two days (22d and 26th) only limited afternoon resupply could be accomplished, and on the 21st and the 27th, no VFF aerial resupply was done. A potentially hazardous situation was averted by maintaining high levels of supply during flying weather, and utilizing ASRT procedures for IFR drops by KC-130 and CH-46. ASRT paradrops accounted for 113 S/T of resupply. As of 9 March, a total of 5,008 S/T had been delivered by helicopters and paradrop in support of Operation DEWEY CANYON.

(5) Summary. Logistic support continued to meet all tactical situations. In spite of two major operations being under way simultaneously, and the occasional logistic setbacks attributable to enemy interdiction and weather, LOCs remained open and levels of supply and support were excellent during the entire month in I Corps.

b. Dental

(1) Dental Civic Action (MED CAP II) was conducted by III MAF Dental Companies during the month of February as follows:

(a) Patients Treated	1,468
(b) Dental Procedures	4,923

(2) MEDCAP for the indigenous population continues to be held at the III MAF Dental Facility.

(3) The Twentieth Dental Professional and Administrative Conference was held in conjunction with a meeting of the I Corps Dental Society on 8 February at the 95th Evacuation Hospital in Danang.

(4) The Force Dental Officer made visits to dental/medical facilities in the Danang area during the month of February.

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(5) Captain W.L. DARNALL, DC, USN, departed on emergency leave on 13 February. Captain J.G. CHUDZINSKI, DC, USN, 1stMAW Staff Dental Officer, was given additional duty orders as Acting Force Dental Officer.

(6) Captain DARNALL was detached as Force Dental Officer on 27 February.

c. Embarkation

(1) Narrative Summary

(a) Air. Four airfields (Quang Ngai, Tien Phuoc, Baldy and Ha Tan) were surveyed during February. Continued construction at Quang Ngai progressed to the point where the field was open to aircraft including C-130 size. Due to intermittent mortar fire, Tien Phuoc was restricted to 834th Air Division aircraft unless close air support was present to provide suppressive fires. Baldy was open to aircraft including C-123 size, but Ha Tan remains closed to all fixed wing aircraft larger than the C-7 due to a depression in the runway. Plans are underway for repairs.

Major operations supported during the reporting period were TAYLOR COMMON and DEWEY CANYON. For two days near the end of the month, the 21st and 27th, no aerial resupply of DEWEY CANYON was possible due to fog and heavy cloud cover, but because of pre-positioned stocks, there was no effect on ground operations.

During the month, one unit move, one tactical emergency airlift (250 passengers), one emergency resupply (52 S/T), and 31 combat essential flights (2385 passengers and 505.5 S/T) were conducted.

Relieved of tactical-logistic mission since early December (due to other operational priorities), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing KC-130s were again committed and flew various missions in support of tactical operations during the month. Of the 5,008 S/T air delivered by KC-130s and helicopters, 113 S/T were delivered utilizing ASRT paradrop procedures, of which 17 S/T were dropped by CH-46 helicopters and 96 S/T by KC-130s. Due to lower speeds and better ballistic information, the helicopter drops were most accurate. The complete breakdown on ASRT paradrops is as follows:

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>RUNS</u>	<u>LOADS</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
KC-130F	12	63	105	96

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<u>ACFT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>RUNS</u>	<u>LOADS</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
CH-46D	18	18	18	17

A total of 2,114 S/T were delivered by helicopters in IFR conditions.

A grand total of 85,842 passengers and 26,680 S/T cargo were tactically air-transported during February.

(b) Surface. Surface operations accounted for 396,098 S/T throughput, or a daily average of 14,146.3 S/T, contributing to an overall satisfactory level of supplies throughout ICTZ. This was accomplished in spite of five days of adverse weather and surf conditions which halted boat operations, and three enemy-initiated series of incidents.

On 21 February at 0320H an enemy mine explosion at the Cua Viet NSAD Ramp damaged LCM-6 (Number 25) and killed one crewmember. Forty minutes later a second enemy mine explosion damaged two LCM-8s (the 735 and the 871) but caused no casualties. A third explosion shortly thereafter caused no damage or casualties. At 0600H, during a waterborne sweep of the area, a PBR sighted a swimmer, and following a concussion grenade run, recovered the body of an NVA swimmer wearing underwater equipment. One additional enemy mine was found on the river bottom and disarmed.

On 25 February, NSAD Sa Huynh came under mortar and small arms fire, resulting in one NSAD man WIA, but causing no damage.

On 27 February, at 2225H, an explosion believed to have been caused by enemy rocket attack occurred at the Danang Bridge Ramp. Detonating munitions which were being loaded aboard the LCU 1500 and the YFU 78 destroyed both craft, and caused moderate shrapnel damage to LCU 1614. In addition to substantial damage done to loading-unloading facilities and equipment in the immediate vicinity of the blast, several semi-permanent metal and wooden buildings were levelled and others made at least temporarily unusable due to structural weakening and ruptured walls and roofs. The present casualty count stands at 2 KIA, 54 WIA and 21 MIA, presumed dead. In spite of the losses and damage, the ramp resumed full operations on the morning of 1 March. Investigation, repair and recovery operations began early on 28 February and continue. Full restoration of the facility will be accomplished by late March. The total ammunition lost was 344 S/T, which had no effect on operations.

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(2) Air Operations Summary

<u>USAF</u>		<u>USMC</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/T)</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/T)</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/T)</u>
60,407	20,494.9	25,435	6,185.0	85,842	26,679.9

Special Missions Flown during February

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REQUEST</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>TOTAL CARGO (S/T)</u>	<u>PAX</u>
TAC E	1	C-123	0	250
ER	1	C-130	52.0	0
CE	31	C-123/ C-130	505.5	2385

(3) Surface Operations Summary

48 Deep Draft vessels embarked/debarked at Danang  
 46 MSTs LST's embarked/debarked at Danang  
 24 USN LST's embarked/debarked at Danang  
 312 LCU/YFU's embarked/debarked at Danang  
 81 Barges embarked/debarked at Danang

Monthly Port Performance Summary (S/T)

<u>Port</u>	<u>Offload</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>	<u>Throughput</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>
Danang	150,413	5,372	256,547	9,162
Dong Ha/ Cua Viet	31,693	1,132	37,542	1,341
Hue/Tan My/Phu Bai	23,857	852	27,003	964
Chu Lai	40,841	1,459	48,006	1,715
Totals	246,804	8,815	369,098	13,182

(4) Highway Operations SummaryResupply Missions (S/T) (85 Convoys)

Danang, North	3,854
Danang, An Hoa	5,662
ARVN, North	1,233
Others	2,581
Total Resupply	13,330 S/T

Retrograde Missions (81 Convoys).

Total:	4,835 S/T
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(5) Chronological Listing of Significant Events

1-2Feb - Surface cargo operations were halted throughout ICTZ due to adverse weather and surf conditions.

3Feb - Improved weather returned boat operations to normal.

4Feb - Ha Tan airfield was surveyed and remains closed to aircraft larger than the C-7 due to a hole in the runway. Plans are currently being formulated to effect repairs.

Surface operations were again suspended due to weather.

6Feb - With improved weather, all boat operations returned to normal.

Baldy and Tien Phuoc airfields were surveyed with the following results: Baldy remains open for aircraft including C-123 size, but Tien Phuoc, due to intermittent enemy harassment by fire, is open to 834th Air Division traffic only when close air support is provided for suppressive fires.

8Feb - Surface operations were again suspended due to weather, but were back to normal the following day.

9Feb - Quang Ngai airfield was surveyed and remains open to aircraft including C-130 size.

21Feb - Mining incidents occurred on the Cua Viet (See c. (1) (b)).

23Feb - A sapper/rocket-mortar attack caused the destruction of 50% of the ammunition dump and 20,000 gallons of fuel at An Hoa. In the ensuing explosions, 700 feet of the An Hoa runway was rendered unusable by dirt, debris, and loose ammunition blown onto it. Engineer units cleared dirt and debris from the

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runway after EOD teams (brought in from several Marine Corps units in ICTZ) had swept the immediate area. Airfield operations were resumed before the end of the month, however, sporadic enemy interdiction by fire continued to interrupt airfield operations through the end of the reporting period.

- 27Feb - An explosion at the Danang Bridge Ramp caused numerous casualties and substantial damage. (See c. (1) (b)).
- 28Feb - An aerial delivery of 105mm ammunition, water and rations was made to FSB Cunningham by 1stMAW KC-130s. The first drop was made visually as the Cunningham ASRT was not calibrated. The drop fell 3000 feet from the zone, so the second drop was cancelled. Another air-drop attempt was made later that day, but due to the necessity of continuing friendly fires, the aircraft were unable to reach the drop zone and orbited until a low fuel state forced cancellation of the mission. The resupply was subsequently accomplished by helicopter.

d. Engineer

Road and Bridge Resume.

(1) Incidents of enemy harassment and interdiction of primary road LOC remained at the low levels reported for January during most of the reporting period. The last week of February, however, reflected the increased level of enemy activity noted throughout ICTZ. By 28 February, a total of 16 bridges and culverts had been damaged or destroyed, constituting a 200% increase over the previous month. The majority of these incidents occurred on QL-1 between Danang and the II Corps border. Most damage was quickly repaired, however, there was one significant incident on the 23d. Two 80 foot concrete spans were dropped from the Song Tra Bong bridge at Binh Son (15 kilometers south of Chu Lai) by enemy sappers.

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Final repair will constitute a major effort, however, by 0330H on the 24th, a 240 foot, class 60, floating bridge was ready for traffic.

During the month 10 bridges were repaired, 17 culverts installed, and 465 feet of tactical bridging emplaced. Asphalt paving operations by the 9th Engineer Battalion in Chu Lai continued toward Tam Ky, with 20 kilometers of two lane highway completed by 28 March.

In general, enemy attempts to disrupt road LOC were unsuccessful, as repairs (when required) were accomplished quickly to permit normal traffic.

(2) Vietnamese National Railroad. The Hue-Danang segment of the VNR (opened on 15 January) was interdicted twice during February. On the 10th, the southbound passenger train was blown one kilometer south of Lien Chieu by three 35-40 pound electrically detonated charges, derailing the engine and four box cars, and damaging 40 meters of track. There were three minor WIA, the engine sustained light damage and the four box cars received substantial damage. The next incident occurred on 27 February, during the heightened enemy activity. In this instance, a patrol train was hit just 150 meters south of the site of the 10 February mining attack. Two 75-100 pound command detonated charges were used, derailing an oil car and three flat cars. 40 meters of track was damaged and the engine sustained minor damage. In both the above instances, repairs were effected, the line cleared, and service resumed within 24 hours. Increased security measures have been placed in effect.

e. Food Services

(1) On 1 February Force Order P10110.5 (III MAF Menu Service) became effective. This document will eliminate a great deal of research by subordinate command messes. It provides a 28-day cyclical menu with a recapitulation of ingredients by meal and by day, simplifying the procedures used in computing ration requirements and placing orders.

(2) On 5 February Force Order 10110.6, the SOP for Class I support for ROKFV, was published. This order provides guidance to personnel concerned with procurement, ration breakdown, and accountability, which is different from that used by U.S. forces in order to provide a more acceptable diet for Korean forces in ICTZ.

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(3) On 24 February Force Order 10110.4C, the III Food Service Program was published.

(4) On 28 February the III MAF Food Service Planning Board held its bimonthly meeting at Camp Horn.

(5) The III MAF Subsistence Operational Analysis Report for the month of January was submitted to HQMC on 18 February. Data highlights are:

Value of "A" & "B" Rations Issued	\$3,572,225.74
Value of MCI's Issued	1,303,352.24
Average Daily Fed "A" & "B" Rations	82,092
Average Daily MCI's Fed	19,286
Daily Average Cost to Feed "A" & "B"	1.40
Daily Average Cost to Feed "A", "B" & MCI	1.55
Pounds of Bread Manufactured	873,840
Pounds of Bread Received From U.S. Army	58,045
Gallons Milk Purchased (Foremost)	562,366
Gallons Ice Cream Purchased (Foremost)	53,674
Gallons of Ice Cream Manufactured	3,126
Pounds of Ice Purchased (Commercial)	4,344,066
Number of Meals Sold	22,624
Cash Collected for Meals Sold	\$11,056.46
Total Expenditures	\$5,223,763.80

(6) Early on the morning of the 23d, shrapnel and debris from the exploding ARVN ammunition dump damaged 5% of the refrigerated storage space at the NSA Danang covered storage facility. Negligible losses of refrigerated items were further minimized by forced issues of fresh foods to nearby messes.

#### f. Motor Transport

(1) Statistics for the month of January for the five motor transport battalions and the FLC truck company are:

Mileage:	612,313
Fuel (Tons):	5,987
Total Tonnage:	65,779
Passengers:	246,314

(2) From 3-28 February the FMFPac Multifuel Instruction Team conducted classes for members of Marine units throughout the Danang TAOR.

(3) From 10-14 February, LtCol K.D. BARNES, the Force Motor Transport Officer, visited motor transport

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units in the 3d MarDiv TAOR, including 7th Motor Transport Battalion, FLSG-BRAVO, and participated in convoy operations to Vandegrift Combat Base.

g. Ordnance

(1) M16A1 Retrofit Program

(a) That portion of the program involving exchange of M14s for M16A1s was completed.

(b) Final status is as follows:

<u>1</u>	Exchange of standard barrel/ sight assemblies for chrome-chambered barrel/ sight assemblies:	55,406
<u>2</u>	Initial Issue	16,257
<u>3</u>	Total	71,663 (100%)

(2) Information concerning the 175mm Gun Phase-in Program is as follows:

(a) To supplement prior training received from the Army, the 1st MarDiv, in conjunction with the Danang Support Activity's Technical Representative, conducted a program of instruction for maintenance personnel and gun crews from the 1st and 3d 155 Gun Batteries. This school ran from the 11th through the 20th of February, with an average of 12 men per day receiving instruction.

(b) By the end of the month, almost all of the 1st and 3d 155 Gun Battery maintenance and gun crews had received training on the M107.

(c) The 1st 155 Gun Battery has been issued 6 M107s and is scheduled to begin operations during early March.

(d) The stock level of 2d, 3d, and 4th echelon parts and secondary repairables on hand is sufficient to support one battery for 60 days.

(3) During the period 23-27 February, rocket, mortar, and sapper attacks in the Danang TAOR resulted in the destruction of 5,636 S/T of Class V. Of this quantity 1292 S/T was Marine Corps stock, which was destroyed when the An Hoa ASP was attacked (Paragraph c. has details). Other stocks (344 S/T) intended for U.S. forces were destroyed in the explosion at the Danang Bridge Ramp (also covered

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in detail in paragraph c.). At approximately 0230H on 23 February, several enemy rockets impacted in the ARVN ASP in Danang (East). The fire and explosions continued until early afternoon on the same day destroying approximately 4000 S/T of ammunition. A total casualty count was not available but casualties within the III MAF compound were as follows: 3 WIA returned to duty, 5 WIA evacuated. The loss of the ammunition caused no operational difficulties.

#### h. Supply

(1) 20 TD-18 tractors were received and issued to III MAF units during February, completing the action initiated by Headquarters Marine Corps (on 10 September) which directed shipment and issue of 75 TD-18's.

(2) The submission of Section I of the III Marine Amphibious Force Logistic Summary Report 1-69 marked the initial report reflecting the ten classes of supply. A new format, prescribed by Commander Military Assistance Command Vietnam, expands considerably the content and value of the report.

(3) For the first time, units under the administrative control of Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force submitted a Logistic Summary this month. Reflecting status as of the end of January, this modified version of the LogSum provides valuable information concerning stock status of essential items and serves as a logistics early warning system for problems within those units. As this Headquarters has the responsibility of monitoring the supply effectiveness within these units, the LogSum will be the prime vehicle for furnishing information upon which the Force Supply Officer can act to provide assistance in preventing problems or overcoming them as they arise.

(4) In anticipation of the General Accounting Office (GAO) review scheduled for 1 April to 15 May 1969, the following steps have been taken during February:

(a) Emphasis has been placed on the completeness and accuracy of the current backorder reconciliation program. This program, more than any other, if vigorously approached, purifies supply records, updates status and identifies shortages and excesses within the various commands. Excesses must be recognized to be disposed of and records must accurately reflect the supply posture of the unit. The GAO always directs its review towards determining the extent that a command recognizes

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and acts in these two challenging areas.

(b) A message was released to all major commands in country, MCAS Futema and Iwakuni, and 9th MAF, to inform these commands of the eminence of the review and stress the importance of a successful reconciliation of backorders. The intent of this action is to allow time for the correction of records and disposition of excesses.

(5) On 25 February 69, FMFPac approved the Monsoon Program proposed by this Headquarters in January. In effect, the program reduces the quantity of special controlled items from 32 to 6, further reducing reporting requirements and the quantity of items requiring force feed of issues from Force Logistic Command.

### 1. Medical

(1) The total average patient load for the two Medical Battalions and 1st Hospital Company was 405 with a total of 1621 admitted and 509 patients evacuated out of country. 169 1/2 pints of whole blood were expended to use.

(2) Information relative to III MAF in-patient treatment facilities is as follows:

<u>TAOR</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH BEDS</u>	<u>ACT BEDS</u>	<u>AVG CENSUS</u>	<u>%OCC</u>
Quang Tri	3dMedBn (-)	240	150	86	57
CSB Vandergrift	C-Co (-) 3dMedBn		10		
Dong Ha	D-Co 3dMedBn	15	12	8	67
Danang	1stMedBn	240	240	131	55
Danang	1stHospCo	100	100	82	82

(3) The USS SANCTUARY (AH-17) and USS REPOSE (AH-16) were LogSup the entire month of February. Both ships were on station at the below listed locations as the tactical situation required.

- (a) Wunder Beach
- (b) Danang Harbor
- (c) Northern Station - approximately equidistant from Phu Bai and Wunder Beach

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(d) Chu Lai - Special Operations

(4) III MAF Medical Department strength as of 8 February is as follows:

	<u>2100</u> <u>Allow/OB</u>	<u>2300</u> <u>Allow/OB</u>	<u>HM's</u> <u>Allow/OB</u>
1st MarDiv	89/75	17/16	1097/1053
3d MarDiv	70/64	13/11	1147/1050
1st MAW	42/34	2/ 3	208/ 193
FLC/1stFSR	8/ 8	6/ 5	156/ 143
III MAF Hq	<u>2/ 2</u>	<u>3/ 3</u>	<u>138/ 131</u>
Totals:	211/183	41/38	2746/2570

(5) Figures shown under III MAF Headquarters include 119 Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Combined Action Program as follows:

1st CAG (Chu Lai)	2d CAG (Danang)	3d CAG (Phu Bai)	4th CAG (Quang Tri)
31	37	33	18

(6) Approximately 110 gallons of 95% Malthion Insecticide Concentrate (anti-mosquito) was dispersed utilizing the Helicopter Underslung Spray System ("HUSS"). Previous aerial dispersal of insecticides was accomplished by specially configured C-123. The advantages offered by HUSS are lower altitude and slower speeds, which combined with greater maneuverability allows a greater or lesser concentration and almost pin-point delivery. 40 gallons were dispersed in the Namoi Point area and 70 gallons in the 1st MarDiv area near Hill 327

(7) Cdr W.S. DUFFY, MSC, USN, HQMC, arrived on 28 February to begin visits of facilities in ICTZ.

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## 7. Comptroller

## a. Significant Events for February

- 15th LtCol. FORD relieved as Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller.
- 15th Major DEACHER assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller.
- 26th Major DEACHER departed on TAD for FY-70/71 Budget Conference on Okinawa.

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**SECRET****8. Civil Affairs.**

a. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III Marine Amphibious Force Civil Affairs program remain the same.

b. Civic Action.

(1) During the month of February, US civic action personnel continued to be the contact point for the gathering of intelligence information. While the intelligence information submitted may be of questionable reliability, it is still significant that the people contacted the CA personnel as this may be a good indicator of the rapport between the two.

(2) In many instances, the Vietnamese apparently are developing a spirit of self-help and are becoming less reticent about contributing their labor for the completion of a project. In all five provinces, the interaction and cooperation among US civic action personnel and local officials continues and lends impetus to the present civic action activities.

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## 9. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

a. Chieu Hoi Program:

PROVINCE RECEIVED RALLIER	TOTAL BY PROV.	REC'D BY		CLASSIFICATION				RALLIED WITH WEAPON
		RVNAF/ GVN	US/ FVMAF	VC	NVA	POL	OTHER	
QUANG TRI	6	0	6	3	0	0	3	1
THUA THIEN	26	23	3	9	2	15	0	10
QUANG NAM	90	74	16	33	2	40	15	3
QUANG TIN	89	77	12	33	2	44	10	4
QUANG NGAI	54	46	8	33	0	11	10	3
TOTAL	265	220	45	111	6	110	38	21

b. Media Production and Dissemination:

## (1) 7th PSYOP Battalion media production:

Total basic (10 $\frac{1}{2}$ "x16") impressions printed: 10,492,123  
 Leaflets printed: 46,417,054  
 Posters printed: 162,000  
 Handbills printed: 1,135,000  
 Newspapers printed: 391,000

## (2) Flight "A" 9th SOS operations - ICTZ:

Total PSYOP sorties flown: 265  
 Total targets scheduled: 5,707  
 Total leaflet targets flown: 1,945  
 Total tape targets flown: 1,344  
 Total leaflets dropped: 118,410,200  
 Total tape time: 251:40

## (3) Ground loudspeaker broadcast hours: 823:35

## (4) Movie showings/hours: 369/186:55

## (5) Cultural Drama Team performances: 7

c. Campaign Support: \*

	<u>Lfts (air dropped)</u>	<u>Air Broadcast Hrs</u>
(1) Chieu Hoi	76,231,002	157:10
(2) Anti VC/NVA	17,262,800	82:55
(3) Support GVN	24,833,399	49:15
(4) Rewards	3,891,999	33:25

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\*NOTE - Includes total US/FWMAF support as reported to III MAF PSYOP

d. Tactical PSYOP In Support of Major III MAF Operations:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Lfts Delivered</u>	<u>Air/Grd Bcast Hrs</u>
(1) Nevada Eagle	16,883,880	48:20/151:10
(2) Scotland	11,674,500	8:55/0
(3) Marshall Mountain	8,394,500	6:15/0
(4) Dewey Canyon	6,768,500	3:15/0
(5) Taylor Common	6,101,100	10:45/35:00
(6) Vernon Lake II (Term 28 Feb)	2,825,000	4:35/0
(7) Kentucky Jumper	3,930,000	4:25/0
(8) Fayette Canyon (Term 28 Feb)	794,000	1:25/0
(9) Linn River (Term 7 Feb)	156,000	1:30/21:00
(10) Russell Beach	0	0/7:15

e. Narrative Summary

(1) General

(a) The upsurge of enemy offensive actions beginning on 23 February was paralleled by a material increase in I Corps/III MAF PSYOP activities targeting both enemy and friendly audiences. PSYOP materials directed towards enemy assembly areas and forward positions identified by G-2 stressed the inevitability of defeat, the prospects of continued heavy casualties, and the foolhardiness of enemy leaders who order troops to make suicidal attacks against stronger, better-equipped and prepared RVNAF and allied troops. PSYOP materials delivered into friendly population centers served to psychologically prepare citizens for the possibility of enemy attacks and stressed the "self interest" logic of cooperation with the GVN. POLWAR/PSYOP programs included hand distribution of special handbills by National Police, APT, and VIS cadre. The planning included advance preparation and production of PSYOP material programmed for employment at various phases of enemy actions, as well as material to support FWMAF/RVNAF counter measures.

(b) The Third Marine Division has initiated a "circuit rider" program to advertise and make payments under the Weapons Rewards Campaign. Third Marine Division PSYOP personnel are now designated as sub-custodians of VIP funds to facilitate rewards payments to informants. The program employs PSYOP vehicles (HB - HE Teams) which travel the major roads and highways broadcasting information to the populace about the dangers presented by ammunition and ordnance material and to publicize the rewards to be paid for information leading to the discovery of such material.

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(c) Under the sponsorship of Commanding General, I Corps, VIS/CORDS has, for the past several months, conducted a creative writing contest, titled: Hoa Gioi Tuyen (translates as "Frontline Flowers"). Entries from Vietnamese civilians and military personnel were received in six categories: plays, memoirs, short stories, musical composition, poetry, and folk songs. The purpose of the contest was to attract public attention and give support to the "Denounce Viet Cong Infrastructure" Campaign that is underway in ICTZ. The contest ended with the awarding of prizes to contest winners in each category by the Commanding General of I Corps, the Mayor of Danang, and other GVN officials on 11 February at Danang. Mass media support for the contest was provided by ARVN/POLWAR, VIS, III MAF PSYOP, and CORDS/PSYOP.

(d) The First Marine Division, Americal Division, and the 101st Airborne Division continued to give PSYOP instruction as part of the indoctrination program for recent division arrivals.

## (2) Chieu Hoi Campaign

(a) A total of 265 Hoi Chanhs were received in ICTZ during the reporting period. This compares with the February 1968 total of 86 and the January 1969 total of 273. Military support of the Chieu Hoi program during the period focused on the targeting of enemy troops participating in attacks, especially those units that experienced major defeats with high casualties. Chieu Hoi appeals stressed casualties, the long string of enemy defeats beginning with the disastrous "Tet Mau Than" Campaign of 1968, and prospects for an early end to hostilities.

(b) The 1969 Tet/Chieu Hoi Campaign has continued with dissemination of special materials as scheduled in the National Plan. Of the total 197 million Tet leaflets received to support the campaign, approximately 110 million have been disseminated, to date. Unofficial reports attribute to the Tet Campaign 135 ralliers of the total received during this period. Phase III of the campaign will continue until 21 March 1969.

(3) Anti-NVA Campaign. As intelligence reports indicated that the enemy were making preparations for offensive actions, the III MAF/I Corps PSYOP efforts focused on the vulnerabilities of those NVA units identified as likely participants. Leaflets and aerial broadcasts targeted at specific units identified by G-2 stressed high casualties, inevitability of GVN victory, resentment of the SVN people at enemy attacks, negotiations underway in Paris, high incidence of malaria, food and medical shortages, and general disillusionment with the enemy cause.

(4) Anti-VC Campaign. In response to those indications that the enemy planned to initiate offensive actions, PSYOP activities targeting the Viet Cong concentrated on weakening the resolve of the Viet Cong soldier by reminding the enemy of the long series of defeats the enemy has experienced

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and the futility of attacking locations defended by strong, well-prepared RVNAF/FWMAF units. Among the PSYOP materials delivered into Viet Cong areas were special messages from Commanding General, I Corps, which pledged consideration and humane treatment to enemy personnel responding to his recommendation that they escape almost certain death by either rallying or surrendering. PSYOP material was also prepared to exploit Viet Cong terrorist acts which resulted in civilian losses. This material targeted two general audiences: (1) the civilian population, which was advised that Viet Cong terrorist acts evidenced the enemies' disregard for the people and demonstrated why the people should deny the enemy any support; and (2) the enemy soldier, who was confronted by these examples of brutality and perfidy and asked to consider whether any cause which countenances such deeds deserves their support.

(5) Support GVN Campaign. Pro-GVN PSYOP during February primarily took the form of a campaign to prepare Vietnamese civilians in urban areas for the possibility of enemy attacks. The campaign stressed the "self interest" logic for the people to support and cooperate with the GVN and RVNAF as enemy attacks against populated areas must result in civilian casualties. PSYOP materials developed and distributed during this campaign emphasized that cooperation of the people with the GVN would likely serve to minimize the damage and casualties that enemy actions could cause. PSYOP material also suggested that the "United Front" of the RVNAF/GVN supported by a prepared and cooperative citizenry might serve to defer attacks, as the prospects of attacking a strong, well-prepared RVNAF supported by the people might cause even foolhardy enemy leadership to hesitate before ordering suicidal attacks with no prospects of success. Pro-GVN printed materials for delivery to Vietnamese civilians were disseminated by APT, National Police, and VIS cadre. Dissemination was primarily by hand with distribution points established at roadblocks, bus terminals, ferry crossings, central marketing areas, etc. To maintain the impetus of the campaign, new materials, primarily in handbill form, were developed each day to reflect the most current information and situation.

(6) Civilian Rewards Campaign. Incomplete reports for February indicate that the III MAF/I Corps Civilian Rewards Program (VIP) yielded a total of 1,009 incidents, with reward payments totaling 1,361,827 \$VN to Vietnamese civilians for information leading to the discovery of weapons and explosives. The tally for February 1969 compares with 1,329 such incidents in January 1969, with rewards payments totaling 1,125,000 \$VN, and, in monetary ranking, is second only to the November 1968 high of 1,491,509 \$VN. It is to be noted that a perceptible change has occurred over the past several months in the location patterns of rewards incidents. Whereas in November 1968 87% of all such incidents were reported by Americal Division, the February 1969 records reflect a healthy diffusion, with Americal representing only 63% of the total, and all other divisions evidencing substantial increases.

(7) Effectiveness Indicators. A high level of VIP reward payments and maintenance of a steady Chieu Hoi tally for the month provide some indications of general PSYOP effectiveness. The real test, however, will come

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if the enemy offensive plans materialize. The threatened "Winter-Spring" offensive offers considerable opportunities for PSYOP exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities. There are, of course, attendant dangers of civilian fears and anxieties which could deteriorate confidence and impair government-populace cooperation. If enemy offensive actions achieve some success, there could be an improvement in the morale of the enemy and a strengthening of his resolve. The major III MAF/I Corps PSYOP effort during February has been the campaign to undermine the morale of the enemy forces and to prepare Vietnamese civilians for the possibility of enemy attacks. PSYOP materials that have been disseminated acknowledge that no government nor community can provide immunity against sapper attacks or attacks by fire, but that the RVNAF/GVN and allies are strong, well-prepared and capable of soundly defeating any attempts by the enemy to invest or to invade the population centers. PSYOP messages stressed that a cooperative citizenery can assist the government in minimizing the damage and casualties that the enemy can inflict, and that this cooperation might even serve to deter such attacks. The response of the people -- especially the citizens of Danang -- to the enemy threats and to those few attacks experienced, has been encouraging, with reports from several sources indicating that the people remain confident and calm in the face of the threatened offensive. The III MAF/I Corps PSYOP efforts to weaken the resolve of the enemy forces will likely not realize fruition until further military set-backs condition the enemy soldiers to respond to the PSYOP appeals and suggestions.

(8) PSYOP Intelligence

(a). The early morning hours of 23 February served to mark the initiation of the much heralded "Winter-Spring" enemy offensive. Concentrating mainly in the three southern provinces of ICTZ, the enemy subjected ARVN and FWMAF forces to sapper attacks, attacks by fire and moderate ground attacks. The type and nature of these attacks were in accordance with prior intelligence estimates. After the initial attack, there was a steady abatement of enemy offensive activity during the ensuing six days. Of significant PSYOP interest was the fact that the enemy's previously reported intensive propaganda activity failed to generate any popular support. Indeed, a consensus of public opinion holds that the local population had confidence in the capability of the present GVN to meet and defeat the enemy's offensive activity, which barely disrupted the routine of their daily life. Despite intensive proselyting activity during the preceding months, the enemy's major objective of inciting public demonstrations hostile to present GVN failed to materialize.

(b) Information gained from enemy documents and interrogation of enemy personnel indicates that the present enemy offensive activity is allegedly slated to last 34 days and to consist of three phases of five, ten and 19 days respectively. Apparently, the enemy intends to exploit current offensive activity as a display of strength in an attempt to influence Paris Peace Talks. In this regard, enemy internal propaganda reveals that final

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victory for the enemy is not anticipated to evolve from current peace talks but rather on the battlefield and a prolonged military struggle is envisioned by the enemy.

(c) Intelligence estimates of enemy's immediate intentions predict a renewal of offensive activity to take place probably prior to 15 March. During the interim period, the enemy is expected to display his military presence through a series of attacks by fire and harassing ground and sapper attacks. Reportedly, the enemy plans to conduct a concentrated propaganda campaign in conjunction with future offensive activity. Enemy propaganda campaign will reportedly be again directed toward the civil populace with stress being placed on the economic aspects of SVN and an emphasis on the emotional appeal to end the war. To succeed in attaining the desired psychological objectives, it is strongly felt that the enemy must first achieve a significant military victory capable of being effectively exploited by propaganda media to permit the civilian population presently under GVN influence and control to become receptive to the enemy's psychological appeal and efforts.

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**SECRET****10. COMMUNICATIONS**

a. Message volume through the III MAF Communication Centers:

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	39,815	37,296	2,519
Outgoing	18,648	18,130	518
Total	58,463	55,426	3,037

b. Combat Operations Center Communication Center traffic:

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Incoming	6,297	5,666	631
Outgoing	8,722	7,862	861
Total	15,019	13,528	1,491

c. Headquarters, III MAF message traffic originated:

January	4,110
February	3,547
Decrease	563

d. The average daily subscriber initiated call rate through the III MAF AN/TTC-28 was 9,127 calls. This figure does not include an estimated average of 2000 operator processed trunk calls for which no accurate count is available due to capability of equipment.

e. Lt SHULGAY attended MACV Frequency Coordinating Conference in Saigon on 1 February.

f. Col CORDES, Hq FMFPac GEO, visited III MAF Headquarters and Marine Corps comm-elect facilities in the Danang area on 2-7 February.

g. LtCol DAVIS made a staff visit to Maint Bn, 1st FSR on 5 February.

h. III MAF Cable Coordinating Committee, Danang Sector met at III MAF on 5 February.

i. Maj REYNOLDS, USA, assigned as G-6 Assistant Operations/Circuits Officer on 11 February.

j. LtCol DAVIS made a staff visit to Maint Bn, 1st FSR on 12 February.

k. Maj HOLDER attended DUEL BLADE II briefing for LtGen LAVELLE at Hq, XXIV Corps on 12 February.

l. LtCol DAVIS and Maj HOLDER made a staff visit to MACS-4 on 16 February.

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m. Lt STUFF accompanied Maj REYNOLDS on an orientation tour of comm-elect units and facilities at Dong Ha on 19 February.

n. Col HORNER attended MACV J-6 Planning Conference in Saigon on 22-23 February.

o. BGen TERRY, CG USASTRATCOMPAC, BGen RIENZI, CG 1st Signal Bde, and Col GOLDENTHAL, ICTZ Signal Group, visited Hq, III MAF on 26 February.

p. LtCol DAVIS made a liaison visit to USA Support Command on 27 February.

q. Maj HOLDER attended Tactical Surveillance Center Working Group Conference at Hq, 3d MarDiv on 28 February.

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III. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

a. PACKGE OUTING: During the month of February 1969, the CIB provided creeps to accompany newsmen on 193 news-gathering assignments covering I Corps ground and air operations, civic action and the GAG program. The MACV Press Center hosted 91 correspondents during the month.

b. MOTOR TRANSPORT: Tactical vehicles on hand included two M-151 jeeps and one M-37 truck. Other vehicles on hand are one 9-passenger Chevrolet S-10 van, two ½ ton Datsun trucks and one Datsun sedan, all in good running condition.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>VEHICLE #</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
M-37	312260	Working
S-10	250871	Working
M-151	358467	Working
M-151	353697	Working
Ford-100	500x014	Deadlined NSA
Dodge-200	500x031	Deadlined NSA
Datsun	500x130	Working
M-151	94-69171	Deadlined NSA
M-151	94-69487	Deadlined NSA

Two M-151 jeeps, a Ford-100 and a Dodge-200 ¾-ton trucks are being inspected at NSA to determine whether they will be repaired or surveyed.

c. PHOTOGRAPHY: The following are the production figures are all from photographic sections in I Corps:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEGATIVES</u>	<u>PRINTS</u>	<u>MOPIC (FEET)</u>
CIB	2,693	16,658	1,640
1stMarDiv	3,918	10,815	4,700
3rdMarDiv	7,060	7,834	2,900
1st MAW	1,107	5,116	1,800
FIG	2,929	9,555	0
I Corps	1,442	1,131	0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>19,141</u>	<u>51,111</u>	<u>11,048</u>

d. RADIO/TELEVISION: During February the Radio/TV Unit edited 38 taped radio features and dubbed a total of 1,505 copies for distribution. Additionally, ISO Sections in III MAF commands produced 647 home town radio interviews on individual Marines and forwarded the tapes directly to the Fleet Home Town News Center for processing and distribution. The breakdown of features and home town radio tapes is as follows:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEATURES SUBMITTED TO RADIO/TV UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL PRODUCTION FOR DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>PHTNC</u>
CIB	13	1,505	7
1stMarDiv	10	N/A	237
3rdMarDiv	15	N/A	128
1st MAW	0	N/A	75
FLC	0	N/A	200
TOTAL	<u>38</u>	<u>1,505</u>	<u>647</u>

(1) The Radio/TV Unit received requests from five new commercial broadcast outlets in CONUS for radio features on a continuing basis. All express an interest in programming Marine news features from Vietnam of general interest.

e. OPERATIONS/ESCORT: The Operations/Escort unit continued to provide services to newsmen throughout the month. Escorts were provided to cover major I Corps operations..... Linn River, Kentucky; Scotland II, Dewey Canyon, Russell Beach, Marshall Mountain, Nevada Eagle, Taylor Common, Fayette Canyon, Hardin Falls, and Vernon Lake II.

(1) Newsmen Casualties. Sy Wolen (CBS) was admitted to the NSA Hospital on 31 January with an initial diagnosis of dysentery. He was released from the hospital on 7 February. Raymond Thomann (Freelance) received a very minor head wound on 3 February, while with ARVN troops on an operation near Hill 55. Dang Van Phuoc (AP photographer) was seriously wounded on 24 February while in action with Vietnamese Rangers south of Da Nang.

(2) Notable Newsmen. Notable news media representatives at the Press Center during February included: Bob Jones, John Reynolds, D. Bellendorf, J. P. Bennett and J. Parsons from NBC; R. D. Threlkeld, M. E. Marriott and A. H. Sargent from CBS; K. Gale and F. Mariano ABC; H. Faas, E. White and D. V. Phuoc from AP; B. Newberry, N. C. Gibson and D. Lamb from UPI; R. Golden from REUTERS; F. Sully and G. Chaplin from NEWSWEEK; N. Orrick from the BALTIMORE SUN; J. Goudstikker, A. Saint-Paul and D. Wilson from AFP; T. Dell from AMEURASIA; the Rev. P. J. Burke from the NATIONAL CATHOLIC NEWS; S. Dickerman from Newsday; L. Burrows from LIFE MAGAZINE; B. Pines from TIME/LIFE; C. Jordan from the ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE TIMES; D. Ayres from the NEW YORK TIMES; J. Benedict, M. Knopp and R. Minnix from STARS & STRIPES; A. Collins from the BOSTON GLOBE; R. Shaplen from the NEW YORKER; J. Irvin, C. Menges, J. Dibling, I. Sharrock and B. Barron from BBC; J. Mincey and H. Mills from NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL; T. Smadja and S. Belisha from COMBAT (Paris); N. Park from KOREAN MOTION PICTURE SERVICE; A. Bryan from OVERSEAS WEEKLY; and R. Milligan from the WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING COMPANY.

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**F. PRESS:** During February the Press Unit processed a total of 369 news feature releases from III MAF and SLF units for release to civilian and military news media. These releases included 216 photographs. On the average, each release was distributed to 50 addressees, or media outlets, including Public Affairs Officers in each of the Marine Corps Districts and five major commercial news services and syndicates. Following is a breakdown by commands:

CIB	26
1stMarDiv	111
3dMarDiv	85
1st MAW	67
FLC	77
SLF	3
TOTAL	<u>369</u>

(1) A total of 7,121 home town stories on individual Marines were forwarded directly to Fleet Home Town News Center for processing and distribution to home town newspapers. The breakdown is as follows:

CIB	163
1stMarDiv	2,010
3dMarDiv	3,010
1st MAW	929
FLC	999
TOTAL	<u>7,121</u>

**G. COMBAT ART:** During the month of February the Combat Art Team in Vietnam consisted of Col John H. ROGERS, SSgt James A. FAIRFAX and LCpl Richard YACO.


(1) Col ROGERS returned to Washington on 19 February when he finished his period of TAD with the Combat Information Bureau.

(2) SSgt FAIRFAX completed 3 paintings, 3 drawings and several sketches during the month.

(3) Cpl YACO submitted 11 paintings and 3 drawings which were used in a CBS news production on Marine Combat Art.

(4) A shipment consisting of 16 paintings and drawings was sent to Headquarters Marine Corps on 10 February 1969.

**H. PRESS CENTER UNIT:** During the four day TET holiday period all Vietnamese employees, with the exception of Nguyen Kuan Lam (the bar tender), were off. The restaurant and hotel were able to remain operational with the help of the CIB personnel.



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All heads in the hotel and restaurant were repainted on 28 February.

The barbed wire defenses around the CIB compound were checked and reinforced in preparation for TET. Additional barbed wire was strung along the river side of the CIB compound.



## 12. CHRONOLGY OF VIP VISITS.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
4Feb69	HYONG SHIN CHAE	LGen:ROKMC	Commander ROK Force
5-6Feb69	W. W. BREHETS	RAdm:USN	CTF 76
7Feb69	F. B. CLAY	BGen:USA	Ass't C/S MACV J-1
7Feb69	J. V. GALLOWAY	BGen:USA	Ass't C/S MIL Ass't MACV
8-9Feb69	C. F. FLINT, OBE	Brigadier:Aust. Army	Engineer-in-Chief, Aust. Army
10-11Feb69	F. SAMPSON	MGen:USA	Chief of Army Chaplains
10Feb69	S. JASKILKA	BGen:USMC	ADC, 1st MarDiv Designate
11Feb69	A. J. GOODPASTER	Gen:USA	Dep COMUSMACV
11-12Feb69	A. L. MACDONALD, OBE	MGen:Aust. Army	Commander of Aust. Forces, Vietnam
11-12Feb69	C. E. LONG, CBE	MGen:Aust. Army	Adjutant Gen., Aust. Army
11-12Feb69	J. E. WILLIAMS	BGen:USMC	CG, 9th MAB
13Feb69	W. J. SULLIVAN	Mr: (GS-18)	Chief of Sea Branch, Research and Engineering, Dept. of Defense
13Feb69	H. R. RAINWATER	Mr:	Jr. Vice Commander, VFW and Ass't Mayor San Bernadino, Calif
13Feb69	F. A. MANSON	Mr:	Dir of National Security and Foreign Affairs, VFW
13-14Feb69	J. W. HUBBARD	BGen:USMC	Dir of Information, HQMC
14-19Feb69	P. J. FONTANA	MGen:USMC	Dep CG, FMFPAC

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SERVICE</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
19Feb69	J. F. FREUND	MGen:USA	Special Ass't for C. I. and Special Activities, Ofc of JCS
21Feb69	D. W. RIEGLE Jr.	Rep:	Republican Rep from Michigan, 7th Congressional Dist
25Feb69	R. D. TERRY	BGen:USA	CG, U. S. STRATCOMPAC
25Feb69	T. M. RIENZI	BGen:USA	CG, 1st Sig BDE/ACS COMM-ELEC USARV
26Feb69	KI CHUN KANG	Gen:ROKMC	Commandant, ROKMC
27Feb69	W. F. BRINGLE	VAdm:USN	COMSEVENTHFLT

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- (1) February 1969 Editions, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Newspaper, "SEA TIGER." *Serialized, Record copy in HRS Library/R*

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